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Abstract 
 
This paper deals with the sensitivity relation between firm-level investment and its 
internal liquidity by splitting samples into two different groups of firms, which are 
tradable (T) and non-tradable (N) sector. The study includes 226 listed companies 
in Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSX) by at least five consecutive years in the period of 
1994 – 2004. This paper finds that during boom period, N-sector is less 
financially constrained, but in burst period, N-sector has greater financial 
constraints. It leads us to the explanation that during boom period N-sector grows 
faster than T-sector, but when crisis hits T-sector recovers more easily. By 
employing panel data analysis, our findings support an argument that asymmetric 
financing opportunities among N and T-sector are common in developing 
countries. Accordingly, this paper provides important explanations on firm-level 
investment behavior around financial crisis, which could be pivotal 
considerations in monetary and other relevant policies.    
 
Key words: asymmetric financing opportunities, financing constraint, firm Investment, 
financial crisis 
 
JEL Classification: D2, E51, G31 
                                                 
ℑ
 This paper was presented in “23rd International Symposium on Banking and Monetary Economics”, Lille – 
France, 22-23 June 2006 
#
 PhD Student in Economics, Ecole Normale Supérieure – Lettres et Sciences Humaines (ENS – LSH), Lyon – 
France. Member of GATE (Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie économique) – CNRS UMR 5824. Correspondence: 
15 parvis René-Descartes, BP 7000 69342, Lyon cedex 07 France. Office R-130, Telp. 33 (0) 4 37 37 65 77.  
Email: aprasety@ens-lsh.fr   
I would like to thank to Professor Alain SAND (GATE, ENS – Lsh and University of Lyon2) and Professor 
Alain CHEVALIER (ESCP – EAP, The European School of Management) for their comments and supports.  
   
1. Introduction  
From academic point of view, the 1997 Asian crisis is a challenging “puzzle” inspiring 
series of research agenda in many fields of studies. Studies on both, theoretical and empirical 
perspectives are employed to understand this fashionable generation of crisis. Even though, 
research on it is still far from exhaustive since intricate problems intervene.  
This paper proposes a piece of explanation centered on the micro evidence of the 
macro economic fragility rising from the asymmetric financing opportunities between 
tradable (T) and non-tradable (N) sector in Indonesia. For this issue, Tornell and Westermann 
(2002) have an interesting explanation as follows, “Many countries that have liberalized their 
financial markets, have witnessed the development of lending booms that sometimes ends in 
twin currency and banking crises and is followed by a protracted credit crunch that outlives a 
short-lived recession”. Due to financial crisis, they identify two pivotal problems as main 
sources, namely risky currency mismatch and asymmetric financing opportunities across the 
T-sector and N-sector.  
This paper deals with the latter issue, which is the asymmetric financing opportunity 
among T and N-sector at the onset and aftermath of crisis. Related to this issue, Tornell and 
Westermann (2002a, 200b, 2004) give further explanation of the coincidence of the credit 
market imperfections and asymmetric sector development as a common phenomenon in the 
middle income countries (MICs) that lead into financial fragility. For concerned countries, in 
the period of lending booms, that sometimes ends in currency and banking crisis, the N-sector 
grows faster that T-sector but inversely N-sector recovers slower than T-sector in the period 
of credit crunch following a financial crisis1.  
In line with this explanation, this paper has a fairly simple question: whether N-sector 
has more financial constraint than T-sector following a financial crisis in Indonesia. This 
question will be addressed by examining firm-level investment sensitivity with its internal 
liquidity or cash flows by grouping samples into two different parties2. The findings of this 
empirical study should be important in explaining the macro economic fragility, since firm-
level investment is a pivotal variable in macro economic fluctuation.  
 
                                                 
1
 Important indication of the presence of credit crunch is the declining of the ratio of credit to GDP 
2
 This study is inspired by Espanol (2005) employing the discrimination of tradable and non-tradable sector 
for analysing the Argentinean firms around financial crisis.  
   
2. Financial Crisis and Firm Investment in Indonesia  
Indonesia is a country undergoing a relatively slow economic recovery from depth and 
width of crisis. In 2004, compared with other countries in South East Asian region, real GDP 
growth in Indonesia was relatively lower: Indonesia had 4.9 % real GDP growth, meanwhile 
Thailand had 6.2 %, Philippines 6.0 % and Malaysia 7.1 %3. The data released by The World 
Bank shows that following the 1997 shock economic performance in Indonesia was weaker 
than average performance of East Asian countries. In Q-4 2001, Indonesian real GDP growth 
was 1.0 %, whereas average growth of East Asian countries was 4.3%.  
After having high economic growth during over one decade, Indonesia faced great 
serious turbulence on economic performance4. The dismal performance of Indonesia’s 
economy was started by the presence of extreme shock due to the 1997 financial crisis. 
Indonesia is a country suffering a deep crisis, where GDP growth reached minus (-) 13 % and 
inflation reached 58.5 % in the end of 1998. Meanwhile, to cope with the high currency 
depreciation, monetary authority in Indonesia (Bank Indonesia) hiked interest rate into 70.44 
% on August 19985. In such condition, there were no firms that can continue their activities 
normally. Approximately a half of Indonesian corporations became technically insolvent due 
to currency depreciation.  
Theoretically, monetary authority is generally able to affect corporate sector through 
multiple channels. Bernanke and Gertler (1995) differentiate: balance sheet channel and bank 
lending channel. Balance sheet channel focus on the impact of the monetary policy on the 
borrowers’ balance sheet through firm net worth, cash flow and liquid assets. Meanwhile 
bank lending channel describe the influence of monetary policy by the changing of the supply 
of loans channeled by banking institutions.    
In emerging countries, bank credit plays a very important role in firm expansion, since 
capital market institutions are considerably underdeveloped. In this condition monetary policy 
                                                 
3
 Data taken from East Asia Update: Solid Growth, New Challenges, published by The World Bank, March 
2006, page 8. The average real GDP growth around 8 countries (Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, 
Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, China) quoted in this report is 6.6 %, which is higher from real GDP 
growth in Indonesia (4.9 %).     
4
 In 1993, the World Bank considered Indonesia as one of the best performing countries in the world by 
about 7 % economic growth during several years. Indonesia is one of the East Asian Miracles. See World Bank 
Policy Research Reports titled “The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy”, Washington 
DC., 1993. 
5
 On August 14th 1997, the monetary authority in Indonesia decided to adopt a free-floating exchange rate 
policy since the depreciation of Rupiah was very high. Indonesian Rupiah (IDR) depreciated sharply to United 
States Dollar (USD); from 4,950 IDR/1 USD in December 1997 to 15,000 IDR/1 USD in June 1998. 
   
directly imposes corporate sector healthiness. By the high rate of interest, money supply from 
banking institution should decrease significantly. In such condition, corporate sector could not 
pay the interest rate. In the same time, due to financial difficulties corporate sector undergoes 
worse balance sheet due to the deteriorating of debt-equity ratio as well as internal liquidity.  
In Indonesia, following financial crisis in 1997, corporate sector perform poorly, 
where investment level was very low. Instead of expanding their investment, firms prefer to 
consolidate their activities first. Following financial shock, the poor performance of firm-level 
investment was strongly impacted by tight money policy applied by Bank Indonesia dealing 
with exchange rate volatility6. However, it is not single factor influencing the gloomy 
condition.  
In July 1999, due to the strengthening of economic condition, Bank Indonesia down-
graded the interest rate into 13.8 % (see chart 1 in appendix). Generally, after July 1999 
Indonesia can release from the period of crisis. It is due to that macro economic conditions 
were relatively stable, in term of inflation, exchange rate and interest rate. Nevertheless, the 
decrease of interest rate failed to support the real sector recovery. It seems that supply of 
credit from banking sector was not channeled into real sector. The question is whether it was 
caused by the inability of the real sector to absorb credit supply or rather the unwillingness of 
banking sectors to offer their credit. 
In study conducted by Bank Indonesia, it was confirmed that credit crunch was present 
following a financial crisis in Indonesia7. Banking sector preferred to not offer their credit to 
firms sector to avoid the borrower risk-averse behavior. Theoretically, the lack of credit 
supply to firms sector could generate a second round effect on the business failures, which 
could also exacerbate the quality of bank loans. In such condition, there is a risk that the 
collapse of real sector could attack banking crisis in the second round. Hence, there is a 
complicated vicious circle which can not be easily resolved.  
                                                 
6
 Tight money policy employed by Bank Indonesia become a central debate until nowadays, since this 
policy is required by International Monetary Fund (IMF) who has a fallacy in his policies in line with really 
happen in Asian countries in the mid of crisis. For this issue, see Iwan Jaya Azis, “What Would Have Happened 
in Indonesia if Different Economic Policies Had Been Implemented When the Crisis Started?”, Asian Economic 
Papers, volume 1, Issue 2, Spring 2002. And also Iwan Jaya Azis, “Modelling Crisis Evolution and 
Counterfactual Policy Simulations: A Country Case Study”, ADB Institute Working Paper Series, No.23, August 
2001  
7
 Bank Indonesia has conducted a research on the presence of credit crunch following financial crisis in 
Indonesia. For further information, the result of study is attached in the www.bi.go.id : “Credit Crunch In 
Indonesia in the Aftermath of the Crisis: Facts, Causes and Policy Implications” Working Paper, 2000, 
Directorate of Economic Research and Monetary Policy Bank Indonesia, prepared by team (Agung Juda, 
Bambang Kusmiarso, Bambang Pramono, Erwin G. Hutapea, Andry Prasmuko, Nugroho Joko Prastowo).  
   
 The soaring of interest rate following sharp depreciation of exchange rate in 1997 has 
caused the increase of firm debt equity ratio. High interest rate attacks the firms leverage. It 
means that the hike of interest rate influences directly the corporate value or firm net worth. 
Moreover, firm with weak financial condition tend to carry out financial consolidation first 
rather than employ business expansion. Meanwhile, firms Firm with bad balance sheet could 
not pay their maturity debt to the bank. In this moment, the deterioration of firm net worth 
induces directly to the balance sheet of banking sector.  
Following a financial crisis, firms commonly prefer to reduce their activities by 
postponing their loan from banking sector. Instead of expansion, firms prefer to consolidate 
their internal activities in operation by reducing their internal liquidity and inventories rather 
than borrow from bank. In this case, demand for working capital credit diminishes 
significantly. Add up with the uncertainties in economic and business condition due to 
financial crisis, firms prefer to use their own capital rather that borrow from bank with high 
interest rate.  
Bank Indonesia also finds that firms prefer to use their own fund (retained earnings) as 
the main source of the finance in the aftermath of crisis8. As amount of 56% from respondents 
in this survey use the retained earning, meanwhile 44% use the external fund of which the 
majority still originates from the bank credit, namely around 24% comprising 14% working 
capital credit and 10% investment credit. Others source of external financing are the capital 
market (6%), offshore loans (5%), bonds (3%), and their own group (1%)9. 
Balance sheet effect mechanism attacks simultaneously firm and banking sector. This 
mechanism commonly happens in country with weak corporate and banking sector, where 
third generation of crisis is present. In Mexico crisis has decreased GDP in the last three 
quarters of 1995 from 9.2% into -8% and 7%. However, Mexico had better chance than 
Indonesia since economic condition could be immediately recovered.  In the second quarter of 
1996, GDP growth grew at an average of above 5% until the first quarter of 199810.  
 In Mexico, asymmetric financing constraint was also present, where in post crisis 
period, tradable sector grow and recover easily, whereas non-tradable sector face stagnation 
                                                 
8
 Despite of the reluctant of banking sector to offer credit to the firm sector, the survey of Bank Indonesia 
for 120 firms concerning on the financing behavior following a financial crisis in Indonesia also confirm that 
firms sector is reluctant to access credit from banking sector.  
9
 See Juda Agung et al. (2000). 
10
 The comparison with neighbouring countries in East Asia and Latin America is addressed also in the 
study of Juda Agung et al. (2000) 
   
following crisis and the presence of credit crunch. Although, some researches predict that 
usually tradable sector is able to get funding from the international market, but non-tradable 
sector must depend on own financing since bank is reluctant to provide credit for the latter 
sector11. 
 
3. Empirical Research 
To deal with the question of which sector performs better (T or N) in before and post-
crisis period, this paper employs the relatively rigorous equation measuring the sensitivity of 
the firm-level investment and its liquidity.  
 
3.1. Investment equation 
Since a seminal paper of Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen/FHP (1988), the issue of 
financing constraints and firms investment have been popular debates among scholars12. FHP 
show that firms which are identified a priori as financially constrained have greater 
sensitivity in investment to the availability of internal finance in term of cash flow. In their 
proposition on financing constraint paradigm, they claim that the sensitivity of investment and 
liquidity is driven by the presence of the asymmetric information in capital market.  
This argument is substantially different from neoclassical perspective on investment 
such as Modigliani and Miller/MM (1958) who promote the irrelevance of financial structure 
theory explaining that financial policy is not relevant for real investment decisions under 
certain conditions13. Oppositely, FHP propose the theoretical models of imperfections in 
capital market implying that external financing is more costly than internal financing for 
many firms. Since the degree of asymmetric information and agency costs depends on firm 
characteristics, certain firms may be more sensitive to financial factors than others. In other 
words, industrial or individual characteristics of the firms become important determinants of 
investment sensitivity to internal finance (cash flow).  
Under the argument of FHP, investment should be significantly related to proxies for 
changes in net worth or internal fund.  As in many previous studies, this paper uses the ratio 
                                                 
11
 This issue is still debatable. Espanol (2005), for example, provides empirical evidence that following a 
financial crisis in Argentine, tradable sector is more financially constrained than non-tradable sector.  
12
 Different from MM, FHP assume that external finance is more expensive since the asymmetric 
information is presence.  
13
 In their seminal paper, Theory of Capital Structure, published in 1958, MM describe that firm financial 
structure will not affect its market value in frictionless capital market. They assume that information is perfect in 
capital market.  
   
of cash flow to the capital stock (CF/K) as the internal financing condition of the firms. A 
large body of research has found that the sensitivities of investment on its cash flow are 
higher for financially constrained firms (FHP, 1998; Chirinko and Kalckreuth, 2002).  
To provide empirical evidence, this paper uses the basic equation originally developed 
by FHP (1988) as follows:  
 
I = f(investment opportunities) + g(Internal funds) 
or 
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where Iit represents investment in fixed assets for firm i during period t, X represents a vector 
of variables, and u is an error term for i and t.  
Following FHP (1988), the function g depends on the firm internal cash flow (CF), 
which represents the potential sensitivity of investment, to fluctuations in available internal 
finance, after investment opportunities are controlled for through the variables in X. All 
variables are divided by the capital stock in the beginning of period (Kt-1). 
It is commonly applied the sensitivity of internal capital and investment into different 
characteristic of firm, such as low and high of dividend payout rate (Fazzari et al., 1998), 
Keiretsu or independent firms (Hoshi et al., 1991), bond rating (Whited, 1992), and tradable 
or non-tradable sector (Espanol, 2005). Since the interest of this research resides on the 
asymmetric sectoral development, this paper runs regression for different firm categories, 
which are Tradable (T) and Non-tradable (N) sector. This paper use fixed asset as a proxy of 
long-term investment. For capturing the sensitivity of T and N-sector, this paper employs the 
following equation (2)  
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where  
K  = Fixed-asset 
I   =  Investment in long-term or gross investment (Kt – Kt-1) 
CF  = Cash Flow 
Q  = Tobin’s Q 
S  = Total Sales 
∆WK  = Change of Working Capital (Current Assets – Current Liabilities) 
D  = Total Debt  
T  = Tradable sector 
N  = Non-tradable sector 
 
For robustness check, this paper employs several regression procedures. First, running 
estimation by excluding proxies of profitability and market value of the firms, which are lag 
of sales and Tobin Q.  
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Other check of robustness is employed by considering the industrial sector effects. To 
do this, this paper uses equation where dummies of industrial sectors are introduced. By this 
equation, this paper focuses on the effects of industrial sector on the relation between firm 
investment and liquidity. For this purpose, this paper does not split sample on two different 
groups as be done in previous equation or equation (2), rather than applying dummies for each 
sector by equation (4) as follows:  
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Industrial sector dummies14 
1. Sector A (basic industry) =  agriculture (sector 1), mining (sector 2). 
2. Sector B (manufacturing) = basic industry & chemical (sector 3), miscellaneous 
industry (sector 4), consumer good industry (sector 5) 
                                                 
14
 For sector dummies we use JASICA or Sectoral Index classification which is launched by Jakarta Stock 
Exchange authority on January 1996 
   
3. Sector C (services) = property, real estate & building construction (sector 6), 
infrastructure, utilities & transportation (sector 7), trade, service & investment (sector 
9)15 
 
3.2 Variables 
3.2.1. Dependent Variable 
3.2.1.1. Investment  
In common understanding, firm-level investment is the value of machinery, plants, and 
buildings that are bought by firms for production purposes. Accordingly, this paper use fixed-
asset as proxy of investment in long-term period. Theoretical prediction considers that 
constrained firms should display a stronger sensitivity of investment to cash flow (FHP, 1998; 
Chirinko and Kalckreuth, 2002; Bruinshoofd, 2003). In this case, if MNC face larger financial 
constraints than firms from DC, it should be expected that αcfMNC to be higher than αcfDC. 
  
3.2.2. Independent Variables  
3.2.2.1 Cash-Flow 
In Fazzari, Ferri and Greenberg (2003) we find that in the Keynesian endogenous 
investment model, if cash flow is insufficient to finance investment, firms take on debt. The 
implication is that investment activities should be financed primarily by internal finance. In 
this case, generally cash flow should be negatively related to firm investment.   
Recently, a large body of literature suggesting that because of information 
asymmetries and capital market imperfections, corporate investment expenditure are 
significantly influenced by internal ability of firms to generate internal cash. It leads to the 
explanation that firm prefer first to the internal equity rather than external debt, so that 
investment should be negatively related to debt.  
 
3.2.2.2 Tobin’s Q 
Tobin’s Q is associated with firm’s market capitalization reflecting the market 
anticipations of firm profitability investment opportunities. Tobin Q is measured by market 
value of assets deflated by book value of assets. In this paper, αq  is expected to be significant 
and positive.  
                                                 
15
 We exclude financial sector (sector 8) since financial statement of this sector is substantially different 
from other sector industries 
   
 
3.2.2.3 Profitability 
In this paper, sales in previous period are used for the proxy of profitability. In 
common sense, profitability will increase with investment. We expect that profitability will be 
significant and positive. Profitability is considered to explain the past and potential future 
performance of a firm. It is consistent with sales accelerator model; higher level of sales will 
enhance the production capacity in order to meet an enlarged demand (FHP, 1988) 
 
3.2.2.4 Working Capital  
Fazzari and Petersen (1993) describe that working capital is current assets (chiefly 
accounts receivable, inventories and cash) less current liabilities (primarily accounts payable 
and short-term debt), and it measures the firm’s net position in liquid assets. Due to financial 
constraint, Fazzari and Petersen (1993) argue that it is costly for firms to change the level of 
fixed investment, and thus they will seek to maintain a stable fixed-investment path, over 
things equal by adjusting working capital. This argument is comparable with internal net 
works hypothesis (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989).  
External finance, if available, may be more costly than internal finance because of 
transaction costs, agency problems, or asymmetric information. Thus, other thing equal, when 
firms choose to decrease (increase) working capital investment, fix investment should rise 
(fall).  
In this case, αwk  is expected to be significant and negative.  
 
3.2.2.5 Debt 
There are two opposite theoretical analysis about the relation between firm’s leverage 
and cash flow. Trade off theory suggests a positive relationship (Modigliani and Miller, 
1958), while pecking order behavior implies a negative relationship (Myers and Majluf, 
1984). Meanwhile, signaling theory suggests that a higher debt ratio can be considered as a 
signal of an improved capacity to finance investment, and hence the relation between debt and 
investment will be positive.  
 
 
 
 
   
4. Results  
4.1. Data set and Univariate Analysis 
For this study, we include all non-financial firms listed in the Jakarta Stock Exchange 
(JSX) by using yearly accounting data provided by JSX’s database and Indonesian Capital 
Market Directory (ICMD) provided by ECFIN, a private company. We have 298 samples of 
all non-financial firms listed in various different time period. In both data base, we do not find 
the variable of cash flow. Accordingly, we accessed directly to the annual report of each firms 
documented manually in JSX. In this case, we work manually to input data.  
We sort data with at least 5 consecutive years and we find 234 firms. Furthermore, we 
exclude the outliers by sorting data from their median and standard deviation. We decide to 
exclude data with more than 10 percent of standard deviation. And finally, we have 226 firms 
for the period of 1994 – 2004. For classification of T and N-sector, we follow the JSX’s 
category.  
In graph 1, we can see how investment fluctuates during the period of study (1995 – 
2004)16. We find that on the onset of crisis (1995 – 1996) both sector (T and N) were actually 
declining. They (both sectors) respond comparably the 1997 financial crisis, where the rate of 
investment has dropped drastically in the aftermath of crisis (1998 – 1999). From this graph, 
it is actually difficult to analyze which sector grew faster before crisis and sector recover 
quicker in the post crisis. The median of the investment rate among both sectors have 
comparable tendency.  
For examining the different investment level between T and N sector, this paper 
employs two tests of variances, which are t-test for mean variance (t-statistic) and Wilcoxon 
rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test for median variance (z-statistic). And we can seen in table 1 
(in appendix) that there is no significant different of the firm-level investment between both 
sectors. 
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 This study use time lag variables for deflator, which is gross capital. Consequently, the time of study 
lessen one period due to the absence of deflator for last period (1994).  
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Source: author’s calculation based on JSX’s database and  
Indonesian Capital Market Directory provided by ECFIN 
Note: T is tradable sector, N is non-tradable sector 
 
In term of cash flow volatility or firm liquidity such as described in graph 2, there are 
no significant differences between tradable and non-tradable sector. This observation is valid 
since tests of variance show there are no such significant differences between tradable and 
non-tradable sector in term of cash flow.  
Graph 2. Median of Cash Flow over Capital Stock ( )
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Source: author’s calculation based on JSX’s database and  
Indonesian Capital Market Directory provided by ECFIN 
Note: T is tradable sector, N is non-tradable sector 
 
Tobin Q as a proxy of firm opportunity is also not significant different in both sectors. 
The graph 3 shows a slight difference of Tobin Q in both sectors. However by the test of 
variance it is evident that the both sectors have no significant differences in Tobin Q. Tests of 
variance show that N sector has higher mean variance of Tobin Q in 0.2389 as well as higher 
median variance in 0.556. But both tests for t-statistic and z-statistic are not significant.   
 
 
   
Graph 3. Median of Tobin Q  
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Source: author’s calculation based on JSX’s database and 
Indonesian Capital Market Directory provided by ECFIN 
Note: T is tradable sector, N is non-tradable sector 
 
 From the following graph (graph 4), it seems that T-sector has much higher level of 
sales. Test of variance also shows a significant difference in 1 percent for t-statistic and 5 
percent for z-statistic. However, there is dubious evidence, since t-test which measure the 
difference with mean shows that N-sector has higher sales (6.406) meanwhile Wilcoxon rank-
sum (Mann-Whitney) test inversely show that N-sector has smaller sales (62.091). It is 
showed that the variance of firm’s sales is relatively high.  
Graph 4. Median of Lag of Sales over Capital Stock ( )
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Source: author’s calculation based on JSX’s database and  
Indonesian Capital Market Directory provided by ECFIN 
Note: T is tradable sector, N is non-tradable sector 
 
In term of working capital, graph 5 shows how T and N-sector move comparably. And 
this evidence is supported by t-statistic and z-statistic, which show that there is no such 
significant difference in working capital between T and N-sectors.  
   
Graph 5. Median of Working Capital over Capital Stock ( )
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Source: author’s calculation based on JSX’s database and 
Indonesian Capital Market Directory provided by ECFIN 
Note: T is tradable sector, N is non-tradable sector 
 
In term of debts, N-sector has much more higher than T-sector. Previous researches 
find that N-sector in South East Asian countries plays an important role in propagating 
financial debacle since most of them had revenues in local currencies but their leverages were 
in foreign currencies. By this research it seems that N-sector has a higher debt ratio as showed 
by test of variance, which are shown by t-stat in 10.08 and z-stat in 10.375 (both are 
significant in 1 percent).  
 
Graph 6. Median of Total Debt over Capital Stock ( )
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Source: author’s calculation based on JSX’s database and 
Indonesian Capital Market Directory provided by ECFIN 
Note: T is tradable sector, N is non-tradable sector 
  
During the crisis (1997 – 1998) firms have a higher rate of debt due to currency 
depreciation. Data from Bank Indonesia shows that outstanding of investment credit 
   
augmented during the crisis period even though interest rates have been increased17. It seems 
that most of firms failed to reschedule their debts and for avoiding the risk of bankruptcy, 
they had to own to external parties.  
Many firms have been collapse. But they were not liquidated rather than were taken 
over by IBRA (Indonesian Banking Restructuring Agency) which has a main task to 
restructure banking sector by taking over firms with bad-debts. In table 7 (in appendix), we 
can see the 200 highest debtors under IBRA were dominated by services and manufacturing 
companies. It means that both sector (T and N), even they face the same shock, have 
comparable responses.  
However, both sectors have significant different in profitability proxied by lag of sales 
and debt level. In the total period (1994 – 2005) N-sector has much higher level of debts. In 
term of profitability, N sector has higher than T sector (in t-stat) of profitability but less in 
median (z-stat) of profitability. It could be happened since N sector has higher standard 
deviation of profitability (8.883) measured by the lag of sales rather than T sector (4.576).  
It can also be argued that N sector has higher heterogeneity of firms concerning firm 
profitability. Analysis of the sectoral behavior will be described bellow. But it should be 
important to note that by univariate and descriptive analysis, the behavior of T and N sector is 
not strikingly different even due to financial crisis.  
 
4.2. Multivariate Analysis 
4.2.1. Tradable and Non-tradable Sector Analysis 
 This research uses two famous methods of panel data analysis, namely fixed effect 
and random effect models. The fixed-coefficient model assumes that each company has 
different coefficients or that the variation of coefficients is correlated with the explanatory 
variables, meanwhile random-coefficient model assumes that, conditional on company-
specific effects, the remaining slope coefficients are randomly distributed around a certain 
mean within each of these groups (Hsiao and Tahmiscioglu 1997). Hausman-test leads us to 
select the most appropriate estimation. The rejection of the Hausman-test indicates that the 
fixed effect model is better and therefore it must be chosen18. 
                                                 
17
 See graph 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 in appendix 
18
 In this study, I use 5 percent of significant level as a measurement to reject null hypothesis. The result of 
the Hausman test is attached together with the result of regression in appendix 
   
Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) predict that firms, which have higher 
coefficient correlation in cash flow and investment, are firms, which have more financially 
constraints. In this research we can find (table 2 in appendix) that before crisis, the 
coefficient correlation of T-sector is (-10.038), but it is not significant. In this period, N-
sector has –77.186 in 99 percent level of confidence. It means that T-sector has more 
financial constraint than N sector in the period of before crisis. But in post-crisis, N-sector 
has much higher coefficient correlation (28.772 in 1 percent of significant level > -22.009 not 
significant) of the firm-level investment and its liquidity, which lead us to understand that in 
post-crisis period N-sector was undermined much more severe in their financial constraint.  
These findings are consistent with the argument on boom-burst of the sector 
development as predicted by Tornell and Wastermann (2002). They predict that in the period 
of boom, N-sector will develop faster rather than T-sector but in the burst period N-sector 
should be much more difficult to recover.  
In this research we also find that Tobin Q  is not effective for controlling the relation 
between investment and liquidity since the coefficient is not significant in all period of time 
(before and post-crisis, even in total period). Meanwhile, as presented in table 2 (in 
appendix), debt is very persistent in our estimation, since significant level for all period (total 
period, before and post-crisis) is relatively high (1 percent). Furthermore, the signs of the 
coefficient of total debt are always positive. It lead to the explanation that most firms use 
external financing for their activities. This piece of evidence is in line with trade-off theory 
predicting that financing choice is irrelevant in investment decision since capital market 
perfectly work so that firms can access external capital easily and without cost (Modigliani 
and Miller 1958, 1963).   
In our case, coefficient of total debt to investment before crisis period is much higher 
(1.071) than coefficient in post-crisis period (0.120), both with 1 percent of significant level. 
It could indicate that before crisis firms in Indonesia were more exposed to the external debt, 
but in post-crisis period debts diminished. By the descriptive data mentioned before (graph 4 
above), it is especially the case for N-sector.  
Robustness check proceeded by employing estimation without lag of sales and Tobin 
Q support the main finding (table 3 in appendix), which in before crisis period T-sector has 
higher coefficient correlation with investment (-5.401 > -73.008). It means that liquidity is 
more important in T-sector or in other words T-sector is more financially constrained. 
   
Meanwhile in post crisis period, N-sector has much higher coefficient (27.354 > -17.868). 
And hence, by excluding the expectation of firm profitability, the findings are robust that 
during boom period N-sector grows faster and in burst period T-sector easily recover.    
 
4.2.2. Industrial Sectors Analysis 
 The main idea of this section is to capture the effect of industrial sector on the relation 
between investment and internal liquidity. This paper considers industrial sectors by the 
definition of JXS, which is divided into 9 sub-sectors19. The results of the effect of industrial 
sector dummies are attached in table 6 in appendix. We run regression by equation (4).  
 It is shown that sector 6 (property, real estate and building construction) has the 
highest coefficient correlation (101.125) on investment and cash flow. It means that for the 
case of sector 6, investment does not decrease with their internal liquidity. It seems that sector 
6 use external financing to maintain their level of investment. This evidence is consistent with 
some investigations around financial crisis in South East Asia which give explanation on 
bubble economy20.  
 Meanwhile, in the case of sector 7 (infrastructure, utilities and transportation) the 
coefficient correlation of investment and liquidity is very weak (-265.076) with high level of 
confidence (significant in 1 percent). It could be argued that firms in sector 7 use their internal 
liquidity to maintain their investment level. More investment means less cash flows.  
 By graphical observation it seems that sector 6 has high investment volatility. 
Generally, due to the 1997 currency depreciation the investment level of firms in sector 6 
diminishes significantly.  
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 See JASICA classification as mentioned above 
20
 See for example Paul Krugman (1998) “What happened to Asia?” mimeo, MIT   
   
Graph 7. Median of Investment over Capital Stock  
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 Meanwhile, by observing graph 8 below, it seems that due to currency depreciation 
firms in sector 2 (mining) decrease significantly their cash flow. Firms in sector 4 
(miscellaneous industry), which include industries such as machinery and heavy equipment, 
automotive and components, cable and electronics, have high level of cash flow.   
 
Graph 8. Median of Cash Flow over Capital Stock  
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 In graph 9 below, we can see that firms in sector 5 (consumer good) have relatively 
high market expectation. It seems that firms in sector 5 have high performance in the capital 
market.  
 
Graph 9. Median of Tobin Q  
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 By data descriptive below (graph 10), we find that sector 9 (trade, service and 
investment) gain most profitable revenue. Currency crisis does not reduce the sales of the 
firms in sector 9. This evidence can not easily be described. It need further research to clarify 
this sign.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Graph 10. Median of Lag of Sales over Capital Stock  
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In term of working capital, in the aftermath of crisis, firms in sector agriculture have 
least ratio of working capital to capital stock. It means that for supporting their activities in 
the same level they did not need employing more working capital, since their revenues can 
cover the needs of their activities.  
 
Graph 11. Median of Working Capital over Capital Stock 
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 In the following graph (graph 12), it is important to note that property sector has a 
high ratio of debt which could be risky. Property sector is basically an unproductive sector. 
This descriptive data support the regression result due to the role of property sector (non-
tradable sector) in risk to exacerbate crisis in Indonesia.  
 
Graph 12. Median of Total Debt over Capital Stock 
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Data from Bank Indonesia as shown in graph 5 in appendix describes how non-
tradable sector actually have been more exposed to foreign debts. Data of investment credit 
outstanding of commercial banks in foreign currency shows that before crisis, the flux of 
foreign debt among tradable and non-tradable sector happened in inverse. Before crisis T-
sector has had more foreign debt but in post crisis period N-sector exceeded.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 The main finding of this paper is that during boom period, T-sector has greater 
coefficient correlation on the relation between investment and its internal liquidity. 
Oppositely, during burst period, N-sector has much greater on the relation. It means that T-
sector is more financially constrained during boom period, but during burst period N-sector 
has greater financial constraint. These evidences lead us to the understanding that during 
   
boom period N-sector increases faster than T-sector, but during burst period, inversely T-
sector grows faster.  
By employing the innovation of FHP (1988) on the sensitivity of firm-level investment 
and its internal liquidity, this paper supports the argument that there is an asymmetric 
financing opportunities between T and N-sector undermining financial fragility, such as 
described by Tornell and Wastermann (2002). On top of that, by qualitative observation, we 
can infer that both sector (T and N) react comparably when the financial crisis is present. 
However, in term of firm profitability and debts, there are great different responses among 
firms in T and N-sector. Both variables should be pertinent indicators for financing policies 
and performance of the firms.  
 Furthermore, by employing industrial sector dummies, we find that sector 6 in our 
sample (sector property, real estate & building construction) has a highest positive correlation 
with investment. In this sector, cash flow increases with investment: the higher investment 
level is the bigger internal liquidity. It leads us to the understanding that investment is not 
financed by internal sources, but by external ones. Accordingly, we can predict that sector 6 
should be the most leveraged firm in Indonesia. This evidence seems to be consistent with the 
thesis of Asian bubble as proposed by Krugman (1998) for example, who explains that 
excessive debt in property sector becomes one of the most important factors propagating 
Asian crisis.  
And hence, this research provides two pieces of evidence that could be important for 
further the research on the field of firm behavior in Indonesia. First, N-sector develops faster 
in boom period but it is more difficult to recover when the crisis hit. This finding is showed 
by the empirical evidence that T sector has higher sensitivity on liquidity and investment in 
before crisis period (1994 – 1996) but N-sector has much higher in post-crisis period (1998 – 
2004).  
 Second, generally firms in Indonesia still prefer external debt for financing their 
investment activities, even in post crisis period. In this case, it supports our understanding that 
capital structure of the firms in Indonesia is actually prone to financial fragility that could 
easily lead to the financial crisis. 
 However, this research has important limitation in line with the data availability, 
which is poorly constructed. The solution of the lack of several variables of data is covered by 
manual works. It is the case for data of cash flow variable. This could be important limitation 
   
in two senses. First, poor availability of data lead limited analysis, and second, efforts to 
provide data by manual works could contain serious errors, which are commonly present in 
the manual works.  
Other important problem in this research is the high volatility of data. To deal with this 
problem, we exclude many companies which contain volatile data in certain variables. And as 
the consequence, the number of firms examined in this research drop significantly. 
For further research, this paper needs improvement on econometrical methods for 
gaining more rigorous results. The general theme of this paper is important for further studies 
on investment behavior in Indonesia. The asymmetric financing opportunities between 
different groups of the firms could be interesting to be investigated for gaining better 
understanding on firm behavior concerning on the financial fragility and economic 
vulnerability in Indonesia. In the future research, it should be interesting to develop 
asymmetric financing opportunities between different group, such as family and non-family 
firms, bank and non-bank relation, MNC and DC, etc.  
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Appendix 
Tabel 1. Regression of Univariate                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
  Mean Median Stand Dev. Maximum Minimum t-stat   z-stat 
Investment over Capital Stock All 0.700 0.180 4.663 5.292 -0.649 0.846  -0.48  
 T sector 0.637 0.181 3.702 4.243 -0.577     
 N sector 0.815 0.178 6.010 7.248 -0.700     
           
Cash Flow over Capital Stock All 0.002 0.000 0.045 0.050 -0.026 0.377  -0.179  
 T sector 0.002 0.000 0.048 0.044 -0.019     
 N sector 0.002 0.000 0.038 0.080 -0.042     
           
Tobin Q  All 1.349 0.738 8.624 12.891 -6.510 0.239  0.556  
 T sector 1.315 0.731 8.591 12.101 -7.762     
 N sector 1.410 0.764 8.690 13.566 -5.674     
           
Lag of Sales over Capital Stock All 3.501 1.612 6.523 34.913 0.087 6.406 *** -2.091 ** 
 T sector 2.828 1.699 4.576 16.560 0.146     
 N sector 4.701 1.376 8.883 43.578 0.062     
           
Working Capital over Capital Stock All 0.052 0.036 5.965 9.136 -10.381 0.248  -0.457  
 T sector -0.060 0.039 2.228 4.342 -6.460     
 N sector 0.254 0.034 9.547 17.374 -16.306     
           
Total Debt over Capital Stock All 4.796 2.159 10.105 51.984 0.255 10.08 *** 10.375 *** 
 T sector 3.182 1.943 5.831 24.097 0.286     
 N sector 7.680 3.060 14.526 71.436 0.235     
T-test for mean variance and Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test for median variance, ***, ** significant in 1 and 5 percent respectively 
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Table 2. Regression of the Sensitivity of T and N sectors                                                                                                                  
         
 Total Period     Before Crisis During Crisis       After Crisis     
 (1994 - 2004)    (1994 - 1996) (1997 - 1998)      (1999-2004)   
         
Intercept -2.192 *** -1.949 *** 0.901 * -0.266 *** 
 (0.163)  (0.753)  (0.463)  (0.059)  
Cash Flow over CS for T sector 6.689  -10.038  -0.181  -22.009  
 (8.942)  (22.966)  (3.338)  (14.132)  
Cash Flow over CS fo N sector -114.384 *** -77.186 *** 5.298  28.772 *** 
 (13.705)  (10.519)  (14.496)  (10.641)  
Tobin Q -0.001  -0.019  0.014  -0.013  
 (0.043)  (0.334)  (0.026)  (0.012)  
Lag of Sales over CS -0.091 *** -0.219  0.162  -0.017 *** 
 (0.024)  (0.261)  (0.149)  (0.006)  
∆Working Capital over CS -0.018  -0.044  -0.013  0.019  
 (0.053)  (0.230)  (0.058)  (0.015)  
Total Debt over CS 0.696 *** 1.071 *** 0.054  0.120 *** 
 (0.029)  (0.102)  (0.045)  (0.012)  
         
Number of Obs 1990  325  392  1273  
R2 – Adjusted 0.6985  0.9917  0.1281  0.2495   
X2 - Hausman Test 532.76  120.67  29.11  76.33  
Prob - X2 0.0000  0.0000  0.0001  0.0000  
Specification FE  FE  FE  FE  
  FE is Fixed Effect. *, **, ***, denote significance at the, 10 percent, 5 percent and  
  1 percent levels, respectively. Standard deviation is reported in parentheses for specifications 
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Table 3. Regression without Tobin Q and Sales 
         
 Total Period    Before Crisis During Crisis After Crisis 
 (1994 - 2004) (1994 - 1996) (1997 - 1998) (1999-2004) 
Intercept -0.527 *** -2.503 *** 1.356 *** -0.258 *** 
 (0.106)  (0.266)  (0.188)  (0.057)  
Cash Flow over CS for T sector 2.499  -5.401  1.284  -17.868  
 (2.213)  (18.925)  (2.872)  (14.214)  
Cash Flow over CS fo N sector 21.166 *** -73.008 *** 4.730  27.354 *** 
 (4.445)  (9.131)  (13.495)  (10.734)  
∆Working Capital over CS -0.364 *** -0.166  -0.030  0.014  
 (0.016)  (0.140)  (0.050)  (0.015)  
Total Debt over CS 0.251 *** 1.010 *** 0.035  0.100 *** 
 (0.009)  (0.054)  (0.038)  (0.011)  
         
Number of Obs 2037  358  399  1280  
R2 – Adjusted 0.6746  0.9913    0.1060   0.2161   
X2 - Hausman Test 489.67  101.09  74.38  53.66  
Prob - X2 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
Specification FE  FE FE FE  FE  
 
FE is Fixed Effects. *, **, ***, denote significance at the, 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels,  
respectively. Standard deviation is reported in parentheses for specifications 
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Table 4. Regression without Tobin Q                                                                                            
         
 Total Period Before Crisis During Crisis After Crisis 
 (1994 - 2004) (1994 - 1996) (1997 – 1998) (1999-2004) 
Intercept -2.065 *** -2.067 *** 0.462  -0.241 *** 
 (0.154)  (0.492)  (0.395)  (0.057)  
Cash Flow over CS for T sector 8.939  -12.599  4.123  -21.624  
 (8.974)  (20.106)  (3.456)  (14.231)  
Cash Flow over CS fo N sector -114.882 *** -76.827 *** 13.926  29.715 *** 
 (13.793)  (9.818)  (11.370)  (10.724)  
Lag of Sales over CS -0.074 *** -0.253  -0.151 ** -0.014 ** 
 (0.024)  (0.241)  (0.065)  (0.006)  
∆Working Capital over CS -0.066  -0.009  -0.266 *** 0.017  
 (0.051)  (0.204)  (0.055)  (0.015)  
Total Debt over CS 0.655 *** 1.087 *** 0.203 *** 0.108 *** 
 (0.028)  (0.091)  (0.036)  (0.012)  
         
Number of Obs 2037  358  399  1280  
R2 – Adjusted 0.6799  0.9915  0.0975  0.2275  
X2 - Hausman Test 493.85  139.58  8.52  66.29  
Prob - X2 0.0000  0.0000  0.1296  0.0000  
Specification FE  FE  RE  FE  
 
FE is Fixed Effects and RE is Random Effects. *, **, ***, denote significance at the, 10 percent,  
5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. Standard deviation is reported in parentheses for specifications 
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Table 5. Regression of T and N sectors (partially) 
        Total Period               Before Crisis              During Crisis             Post Crisis  
       (1994 - 2004)             (1994 - 1996)             (1997 - 1998)           (1999 - 2004)  
 T sector  N sector  T sector  N sector  T sector  N sector  T sector  N sector  
Intercept -1.557 *** -2.232 *** -1.427 ** 1.559  1.125 *** 0.578  -0.439 *** 0.145  
 (0.136)  (0.428)  (0.569)  (2.623)  (0.431)  (1.615)  (0.052)  (0.105)  
Cash Flow 3.131  -159.446 *** -4.666  -57.001 *** 0.718  4.215  -36.945 *** 11.935 *** 
 (7.565)  (16.303)  (15.816)  (18.424)  (3.718)  (16.071)  (12.187)  (2.943)  
Tobin Q 0.008  -0.007  0.179  -0.616  0.018  -0.057  -0.018  0.004  
 (0.040)  (0.107)  (0.270)  (0.811)  (0.028)  (0.186)  (0.012)  (0.012)  
Lag of Sales over CS -0.162 *** 0.027  -0.092  -0.734  0.056  0.239  -0.054 *** 0.009 *** 
 (0.026)  (0.042)  (0.219)  (0.594)  (0.210)  (0.311)  (0.007)  (0.007)  
∆Working Capital over CS -0.034  0.104  -0.250  -1.459 * -0.015  -0.012  0.131 *** -0.027  
 (0.074)  (0.075)  (0.217)  (0.836)  (0.072)  (0.124)  (0.027)  (0.010)  
Total Debt over CS 0.818 *** 0.441 *** 0.973 *** 0.936 *** 0.059  0.068  0.285 *** 0.016 *** 
 (0.037)  (0.048)  (0.096)  (0.233)  (0.064)  (0.078)  (0.018)  (0.006)  
                 
Number of Obs 1273  717  205  120  251  141  817  456  
R2 - Adjusted 0.7902  0.6480  0.9965   0.9882  0.1262  0.1769  0.5372  0.0525  
X2 - Hausman Test -  235.94  24.32  94.23  58.89  974.52  210.73  10.92  
Prob - X2 -  0.0000  0.0002  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0530  
Specification FE  FE  FE  FE  FE  FE  FE  RE  
 
FE is Fixed Effect and RE is Random Effect. *, **, ***, denote significance at the, 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively.  
Standard deviation is reported in parentheses for specifications 
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Table 6. Regression for Industrial sector                                                                                                                                                                     
 Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 3 Sector 4  Sector 5  Sector 6  Sector 7  Sector 9  
Intercept -0.285 0.110 0.298*** -2.574 -0.563** -1.495** -1.143 0.343** 
 (0.175) (0.552) (0.092) (1.745) (0.253) (0.649) (1.860) (0.147) 
Cash Flow over CS  -50.096 -14.098 2.738 69.860 -19.282** 101.125*** -265.076*** 3.209 
 (48.590) (27.393) (2.070) (72.861) (8.825) (21.767) (40.998) (6.834) 
Tobin Q 0.063*** 0.010 0.037 -0.004 0.019 0.019 0.878 -0.072 
 (0.021) (0.040) (0.047) (0.094) (0.025) (0.047) (1.320) (0.049) 
Lag of Sales over CS 0.341*** -0.119 -0.032*** -0.816*** 0.035 0.667** -0.073 -0.009 
 (0.077) (0.392) (0.011) (0.302) (0.039) (0.265) (1.351) (0.009) 
∆Working Capital over CS -0.034 -0.334*** -0.032 0.301* 0.167*** -0.110* -0.208 0.041 
 (0.045) (0.163) (0.033) (0.185) (0.059) (0.062) (0.353) (0.030) 
Total Debt over CS 0.003 0.266*** 0.110*** 1.086*** 0.345*** 0.023 0.374 0.070*** 
 (0.032) (0.053) (0.032) (0.093) (0.058) (0.037) (0.342) (0.026) 
                 
Number of Obs 54 63 447 400 325 196  121 399 
R2 – Adjusted 0.5775 0.8385 0.1311 0.8938 0.3498 0.5977  0.9232 0.0991 
 
*, **, ***, denote significance at the, 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively.  
Standard deviation is reported in parentheses for specifications
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Graph 1. Interest Rate of Commercial Banks 
(monthly data) 
 
Source: based on data from Indonesian Central Bank, 
Bank Indonesia (www.bi.go.id) 
 
 
Graph 2. Outstanding of Investment Credit of Commercial Banks  
in  Local Currency (in Billion of Rupiah)  
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Source: Bank Indonesia, author’s calculation 
 
Graph 3. Outstanding of Investment Credit of Commercial Banks 
in  Local & Foreign Currency (in Billion of Rupiah) 
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Source: author’s calculation based on data from Indonesian Central Bank, 
 Bank Indonesia   
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Graph 5. Outstanding of Investment Credit of Commercial Banks  
in Foreign Currency (in Billion of Rupiah)  
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Source: author’s calculation based on data from Indonesian Central Bank,  
Bank Indonesia 
 
 
Table 7. Profile of 200 greatest debtors under IBRA  
(Indonesian Banking Restructuring Agency) 
    
 Non-tradable Sector  Tradable Sector 
 Service  Manufacturing 
1 ABS Industry Indonesia PT 1 Adikara Nirmala PT 
2 Alfa Goldland Realty PT 2 Andatu Lestari Plywood PT 
3 Authotrans Perkasa Indonesia PT 3 Apac Inti Corpora PT 
4 Bahana Bina Ventura PT 4 Artika Optima Inti PT 
5 Bahana Investa Argha PT 5 Asriland PT 
6 Bahana Pembina Usaha Ina. 6 Bakrie&Brothers PT 
7 Bakrie International Finance 7 Bante Java Persada, PT 
8 Bakrie Investindo PT 8 Batasan PT 
9 Bekasi Fajar Industrial Estate, PT 9 Bentoel Prim, PT 
10 Bentala Lestari, PT 10 Bhirawa Steel, PT 
11 Bentala Mahaya, PT 11 Bimantara Citra, PT 
12 BNI Securities, PT 12 Buanagraha Artha Prima, PT 
13 Boga Nandini Andrawina, PT 13 Budiono Widodo 
14 Bonauli Realestate, PT 14 Bukti Jonggol Asri, PT 
15 Bunas Finance Indonesia TBK, PT 15 Bukit Welirang Indah, PT 
16 Citra Marga Finance BV 16 Bumi Angkasa Textile Indonesia, PT 
17 Danamon Finance, PT 17 Chandra Asri, PT 
18 Danareksa, PT 18 Cisadane Raya Chemicals, PT 
19 Datakom Asia, PT 19 Daya Besar Agung, PT 
20 Deemte Sakti International 20 Detta Marina, PT 
21 Dhamala Intiutama Int'l BV. PT 21 Dok & Perkapalan Kodja Bahari, PT 
22 Dharmala Sakti Sejahtera, PT 22 Ekadharma Garmentama, PT 
23 Duta Anggada Realty, PT 23 Fajar Surya Perkasa, PT 
24 Eastglobe LTD 24 Frans Putratex PT 
25 Estika Yasakelola, PT 25 Gema Lapik PT 
26 Global Toserco LTD 26 Gemala Industrie, LTD 
27 Graha Sarana Pratama PT (Suryapaloh) 27 Griri Asih Indah, PT 
28 Indomas Pacific Permai, PT 28 Giri Asih Jaya PT 
29 Indopac Finance 29 Gunawan Textindo PT 
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30 Inti Karsa Daksa, PT 30 Hargas Industries IND PT 
31 Jababeka Interantional BV 31 Hartono Istana Electronics PT 
32 Kondowana Safari PT 32 Industri Galvanealmas, PT 
33 Mandara Permai PT 33 Intear Pretindo Inti Citra, PT 
34 Metropolitant Land PT 34 Interworld Steel Mills Indonesia, PT 
35 Modernland Realty TBK PT 35 Inti Texturindo Raya, PT 
36 Multi Angsana Ganda PT 36 IPTN 
37 Nelson Investment INT, LTD 37 Jakarta Cakra Tunggal Steel Mills PT 
38 Ometraco Multi Artha PT 38 Jakarta Kyoei Steel 
39 Pasific Interantional Finance PT 39 Jindo Kordeco Heavy IND, PT 
40 Primaswadana Perkasa Finance PT 40 Kalhold Utama, PT 
41 Putra Surya Multidana TBK, PT 41 Kalimanis Plywood IND, PT 
42 Putra Surya Perkasa TBK, PT 42 Karawang Utama, PT 
43 Risjad Brasali Styrindo PT 43 Kertas Basuki Rachmat PT 
44 Risjadson PT 44 Kertas Leces PT 
45 Salindo Perdana F. PT 45 Kiani Kertas PT 
46 Sanggraha Dhika PT 46 Komunikasi Selular Indonesia PT 
47 Segitiga Atrium, PT 47 Langgeng Makmur I TBK, PT 
48 Segitiga Plaza Hotel, PT 48 Lucky Star Navigation Corp. 
49 Sewu Agro Investama PT 49 Mahliagai Senantiasa Makmur 
50 Sinar Slipi Sejahtera PT 50 Maligi Spinning Mills 
51 Sumbermitra Sarana Realtindo PT 51 Mitra Laras Serasi PT 
52 Surya Citra Televisi Indonesia PT 52 Multi Strada Arah Sarana, PT 
53 Tirtamas Majutama PT 53 Multikarsa Investama, PT 
54 Welwin Finance, Hongkong 54 Nasio Dutamitra Electric PT 
  55 Nusantara Playwood PT 
 Trade/Hotel/Restaurant 56 Omedata Electronics, PT 
1 Aneka Agroprasidha PT 57 Palwa Minatama Jaladri PT 
2 Aneka Bumi Prasidha PT 58 Pancashindu Abadi PT 
3 Bakrie Nirwana Resort PT 59 Pangaji Mario Refconindo PT 
4 Banigati Betegak, PT 60 Panggung Electric Corp PT 
5 Bina Perkasa Indograha, PT 61 Papyrus Sakti PT 
6 Caterison Sukses, PT 62 Poyfin Canggih PT 
7 Citra Rapi Hotel, PT 63 Polyprima Karyareksa PT 
8 Citrasarana Graharealty Corp. 64 Prajogo Pangestu 
9 Dewata Agung Wibawa 65 Samless Pipe Indonesia Jaya PT 
10 Dharma Niaga (Persero), PT 66 Sebasli Pratama 
11 Dharmala Sakti Pancagraha 67 Semen Baturaja, PT 
12 Griya Permata Lestari 68 Semen Cibinong, PT 
13 Humpuss PT 69 Semen Gombong PT 
14 Humpuss Terminal P, PT 70 Serindo Djaja Marmer Industries, PT 
15 Mandiri Citrasejati Hotel PT 71 Sipatex Putri Lestari PT 
16 Mas Murni IND, PT 72 Sragen Abadi Tekstil PT 
17 Moeladi PT 73 Staco Arta Karya PT 
18 Mulia Intan Lestari, PT 74 Telekomindo Primabhakti PT 
19 Pengembangan Pariwisata Lombok PT 75 Tensindo Sejati PT 
20 Permadani Khatulistiwa Nusantara PT 76 Terang Kita PT 
21 Prabu Budi Mulia PT 77 The First National Glassware PT 
22 Ramasari Surya Persada PT 78 Timor Putra Nasional PT 
23 Sentra Sintetika Jaya 79 Usaha Gedung Bimantara PT 
24 Sinn Bualuang Public Company LTD 80 Wahana Perkasa Auto Jaya PT 
25 Staco Graha PT 81 Yason Pernana PT 
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26 Swastika Hijau Makmur  82 Continental Sinar Steel PT 
27 Tahta Medan PT 83 Sandatex PT 
28 Tirtamas Comexindo PT   
    
 Transportation/Warehouse/Telecomunication  Agribusiness 
1 Asia Cellular Sattellite PT 1 Arindo Tri Sejahtera  
2 Badiradaya Sentranusa PT 2 Bali Raya PT 
3 Merpati Nusantara PT 3 Central Pertiwi Bahari, PT 
4 Pasifik Satelit Nusantara PT 4 Gerak Maju PT 
5 Satelindo PT 5 Hasil Cipta Laut PT 
6 Sempati Air PT 6 Ikq Muda Seafood International, PT 
7 Widya Duta Informindo, PT 7 Kiani Lestari PT 
  8 Nusantara Ampera Bakti PT 
 Construction 9 Riau Andalan Kertas PT 
1 Batanghari Persada, PT 10 Riau Prima Energi PT 
2 Bukit Sentul TBK, PT 11 Tuwung Agung PT 
3 Hutama Karya, PT   
4 Karyagraha Elektrindo PT  Mining 
5 Lippo Karawaci TBK, PT 1 Humpuss, INC 
6 Marga Nurindo Bhakti PT   
7 Margabumi Matraraya PT   
8 Samurindo Swadaya Sejatera AP   
9 Swadharma Primautama PT   
10 Swaraeka Prasetia PT   
11 Istaka Karya PT   
    
 NN   
1 Ceka Jawa Industri, PT   
2 Indobuildco, PT   
3 Internusa Keramik, PT   
4 Inti Keramik Alamsri, PT   
6 Risjad Brasali Peroxid   
 
Source: Annual Report 2000, Indonesian Banking Restructuring Agency (IBRA) 
 
